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I. INTRODUCTION
In August and September of 2013, Botswana’s courts delivered two
different rulings relating to customary property rights. The first ruling
denied Botswana’s indigenous Kalahari Bushmen the opportunity to
challenge government restrictions on their customary rights to hunt and
gather on their ancestral land.1 The Bushmen’s customary law rights to the
land have been and continue to be subject to vulnerable intrusion because
such rights are not protected by Botswanan law.2 Less than a month later,
elsewhere in Botswana, women celebrated a judgment of the Botswana Court
of Appeal holding that the Ngakwetse customary law could no longer be
used to prevent women from inheriting family property.3 While indigenous
groups and advocates lamented the deterioration of customary rights to land,
women’s rights advocates cheered the court’s willingness to modify a
different set of customary property rights.
In sub-Saharan Africa and globally, these battles for rights relating to
customary law are common. Indigenous groups throughout the African
continent are fighting to maintain access to lands they hold in customary
tenure as competition for land increases, while women fight against
application of customary laws that deny them rights to attain or control
property. Elsewhere around the globe, indigenous groups, particularly those
in resource-rich areas, are vulnerable to land grabs from investors and
governments. In the Americas,4 Europe,5 and Asia,6 indigenous groups face

1
Botswana: Access Case Dismissed – Final End for Bushman Hunters?, SURVIVAL INT’L
(Sept. 13, 2013), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201309160669.html.
2
Although Botswana is considered to be quite progressive in its recognition of customary
forms of land tenure, the hunting/gathering lifestyle of the Bushmen is excluded from
customary law protection. Botswana: Culture under threat – Special Report on the San
Bushmen (II), IRIN (Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/49005/bots
wana-culture-under-threat-special-report-on-the-san-bushmen-ii.
3
Richard Lee, Botswana: Victory for Women’s Rights in Botswana, OPEN SOCIETY
INITIATIVE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201309040359.
html (discussing Ramantele v. Mmusi, [2013] BWCA 1 (Bots.); see also infra note 75).
4
E.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: Canada, ¶ 331, U.N. Doc. A/57/18 (Jan. 11, 2002); Concluding Observations
of the Human Rights Committee: Suriname, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/80/SUR (May 4,
2004); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Ecuador, ¶ 278, U.N. Doc. E/2005/22 (June 7, 2004).
5
E.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Finland, ¶ 17, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/CO/82/FIN (Dec. 2, 2004); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Sweden, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (Apr. 24, 2002).
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threats to their lands and natural resources. While indigenous rights activists
call for government recognition of indigenous land rights and livelihoods, the
“women question,” or, how to ensure the protection of indigenous women’s
rights, remains an open question. In this Article, I consider how African
state governments can legally recognize customary land tenure in a manner
that protects indigenous groups while still affording property and other rights
to women. Because of the global nature of these problems, any resolution in
sub-Saharan Africa is certain to have implications worldwide.
It is worth noting here that although the discussion of customary tenure
involves a discussion of indigenous rights, the battles do not necessarily fall
along racial or ethnic divides, as is often the case in American or European
countries. Many in sub-Saharan Africa who advocate for and are governed
by individualized, formal land tenure systems have ancestors whose land was
once under a customary tenure system. They admittedly are advocating the
implementation of a “white” system, but speaking purely in terms of the
actors, the statutory versus customary battle does not equal white versus
indigenous. Indeed, the term indigenous itself is contested, as both rural and
urban Africans can be considered indigenous to their country.7 In this
Article, the term “indigenous” in Africa is currently used to describe tribal
groups continuing to engage in traditional livelihoods and continuing to live
under customary forms of tenure.
African indigenous groups operating under customary systems of land
tenure are particularly vulnerable to the various pressures on land. Because
these indigenous groups do not operate under the de Soto-style formal tenure
systems preferred by the West and African state governments, their tenure is
insecure against outside interests. These groups suffer well-documented land
grabs by their own governments, who grant access rights to industries
(especially extractive or timber industries) or use land for their own
development purposes. Indigenous groups sometimes also clash with
conservationists seeking to limit humans’ use generally of lands that have
historically been used by indigenous groups.
Women’s rights are
particularly vulnerable in these instances, as their rights are not as secure as
men’s rights under systems of customary tenure.
The impact of land scarcity on indigenous groups adds one dimension to
an already multi-dimensional debate in sub-Saharan Africa about how to
6

E.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: Fiji, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/FJI/CO/18-20 (Aug. 31, 2012).
7
See discussion infra Part III.A.
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reconcile customary law with women’s rights. Recent reports on land tenure
and land grabs have suggested that attempting to enforce formal systems of
individual tenure is counterproductive, and that governments should protect
customary forms of tenure.8 This would serve to protect the groups
continuing to live under customary systems; such groups must be approached
directly by anyone interested in their land if customary land tenure is
legitimized as “ownership” by the state. On the other hand, in sub-Saharan
Africa, women’s rights activists resist the push toward state recognition of
customary land tenure, arguing that their human rights are violated under
such systems.
“Customary tenure,” as a term, describes the types of property relations
that have historically existed and continue to exist among indigenous groups
in sub-Saharan Africa. It is certainly not uniform across groups; by its nature
it varies from one group to another. However, there are some commonalities
that exist across groups. In this Article, I refer to Fitzpatrick’s definition of
customary tenure, which he describes as:
shorthand for property arrangements which are characterized
generally by the following elements: overarching ritual and
cosmological relations with traditional lands; community
‘rights’ of control over land disposal (sometimes delegated to
traditional leaders); kinship or territory-based criteria for land
access; community-based restrictions on dealings in land with
outsiders; and principles of reversion of unused land to
community control.9
Customary tenure falls under the broader umbrella of customary law, the
informal system of norms that have governed all aspects of life, including
property relations, marriage, inheritance, the righting of wrongs, and the
settlement of disputes.
The debate between customary tenure and women’s rights can be framed
in any number of ways, among them: the right to self-determination and
culture versus women’s rights; laws reflecting lived realities versus laws
8
United Nations, Food & Agric. Org., Statutory Recognition of Customary Land Rights in
Africa: An Investigation Into Best Practices for Lawmaking and Implementation 5–8 (2010)
(Rachel S. Knight), http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1945e/i1945e01.pdf [hereinafter FAO
Report].
9
Daniel Fitzpatrick, ‘Best Practice’ Options for the Legal Recognition of Customary
Tenure, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 449, 454 (2005).
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creating new ones; cultural relativism versus universalism; rural versus
urban. Some have argued that such dichotomies are unhelpful, and that time
would be better spent locating opportunities for women within the interaction
between statutory and customary law.10
This Article argues that women’s rights and customary law conflict to
such an extent that any legal system that both protects customary tenure and
aims to protect women’s rights to land ownership must, at some level,
fundamentally alter customary systems of land ownership. In Part II of this
Article, I provide a brief overview of how state governments, women’s rights
activists, and other prior supporters of formalized title systems have come to
agree that some engagement with customary law is necessary. In Part III, I
discuss the international indigenous rights framework and the women’s
rights framework, demonstrating how each approach suggests the
reconciliation of custom and women’s rights. In Part IV, I discuss how both
customary governance and statutory governance in sub-Saharan Africa have
failed women. In Part V of this Article, I analyze some of the suggested
approaches to improve women’s land rights under customary law, and
conclude that any meaningful solution requires a fundamental disruption and
redefinition of customary norms and processes.
II. THE MOVE TO ENGAGE WITH CUSTOMARY LAW
Post-independence governments in sub-Saharan Africa, encouraged by
aid agencies and other international actors, have developed reforms to
formalize the process of land tenure, using the system of land titling so
common in the West. Justifications for these reforms are tied to economic
development, predictability, and fairness in enforcing rights.11 More
recently, in part because of the persistence of and preference for customary
tenure, especially in poor or rural communities, many have come to agree

10
Aninka Claassens & Sindiso Mnisi, Rural Women Redefining Land Rights in the Context
of Living Customary Law, 25 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 491, 493 (2009); Celestine Itumbi
Nyamu, Achieving Gender Equality in a Plural Legal Context: Custom and Women’s Access
to and Control of Land in Kenya, 15 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 21, 33–34 (1999); Ann
Whitehead & Dzodzi Tsikata, Policy Discourses on Women’s Land Rights in Sub-Saharan
Africa: The Implications of the Re-turn to the Customary, 3 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 67, 95
(2003).
11
Klaus Deininger & Hans Binswanger, The Evolution of the World Bank’s Land Policy:
Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 247, 249–50
(1999).
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that an effective system of governance must engage with customary law.12 A
survey of the African continent shows that all but three nations provide some
measure of recognition for customary land rights.13 However, the extent of
protection varies among nations and can be quite weak when pitted against
outside interests in the land.14
Outright replacing customary tenure with formal title has proved
exceedingly difficult for authorities and sometimes detrimental to the people
impacted by the changing tenure system. In many sub-Saharan African
countries it is not statutory law, but customary law, which reflects the lived
realities of land use.15 Customary authorities are accessible and available to
the rural poor who otherwise might not have access to any state authorities or
statutory legal enforcement arenas.16 These customary authorities often fill
the gaps in the administration of land tenure regulation by state authorities.17
However, where both customary law and statutory law can be applied to
certain parcels of land, the plural possibilities for legal application can lead
to forum-shopping, non-predictability, and generally a weakening of either
system’s authority.18 Finally, government refusal to recognize customary
rights can weaken the rights of vulnerable groups. Requiring titling when
rural groups do not recognize that form of tenure can lead to vast amounts of
untitled land which, in all other respects, belongs to the communal group
living upon and using it. “When the rural poor’s customary land claims are
not considered to be valid because they lack formal recognition, then only
the rich and the legally adroit, have tenure security.”19 The Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations specifically points out that
even women may lose out in this way: “while richer, more educated urban
and peri-urban women may gain from laws allowing women to own land

12

Id. at 248; Gordon R. Woodman, A Survey of Customary Laws in Africa in Search of
Lessons for the Future, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 28 (Jeanmarie Fenrich
et al. eds., 2011) (“[I]t is now quite widely recognized by policy makers that the observance of
customary laws cannot be suppressed, even if this were desired.”).
13
EMILY POLACK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
ACCOUNTABILITY IN AFRICA’S LAND RUSH: WHAT ROLE FOR LEGAL EMPOWERMENT? 20–21
(Apr. 2013), available at http://pubs.iied.org/12572IIED.html?c=law/globgov.
14
Id.
15
FAO Report, supra note 8, at 5.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 6.
19
Id. at 7.
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(and for land to be sold) the vast majority of poor, rural women will only
lose out as land becomes commoditized.”20
When customary land tenure lacks adequate governmental recognition or
protection, groups living under customary tenure systems are at risk of land
grabs perpetrated by their own governments or outside actors. Even where
laws grant customary rights the same status as other land rights, such as in
Tanzania and Mozambique, groups living under customary tenure find
themselves subject to encroachment of their land and resources.21 The
African continent is teeming with examples of indigenous groups losing land
for any number of self-serving or even seemingly benevolent reasons.
Indigenous peoples have been evicted to benefit corporations22 and to create
conservation areas.23 Oxfam International (Oxfam) has documented the
evictions of those with both communal tenure and formal title to benefit
programs that allow western corporations to offset their carbon emissions.24
Pastoralists in Tanzania have complained of evictions, resulting in loss of
access to local water sources, to accommodate foreign game hunters.25 Land
grabs affect both indigenous and non-indigenous groups in sub-Saharan
Africa, but indigenous groups seem to be particularly susceptible.

20

Id. at 33.
POLACK ET AL., supra note 13, at 20–21.
22
For example, the Cameroonian government leased forest land to private companies
without first consulting with the indigenous peoples living on that land. Elias Ntungwe
Ngalame, Cameroon’s Forest Dwellers Lose Out as Land Handed to Developers, ALERTNET
(Mar. 28, 2013), available at http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/cameroons-forest-dwellerslose-out-as-land-handed-to-developers.
23
Kenya, for example, began a program of clearing Ogieks from their land with the stated
goal of protecting the Mau Forest. Chelsea Purvis, Kenya: Displacement and Resistance – the
Ogiek of Kenya, THINK AFRICA PRESS (Mar. 22, 2013), available at http://allafrica.com/storie
s/201303250089.html?viewall=1. As of March 15, 2013, the evictions were ordered to cease
by the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. In re African Comm’n on Human and
Peoples’ Rights v. The Republic of Kenya [African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights],
Application No. 006/2012, Order of Provisional Measures (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://
www.african-court.org/en/images/documents/Orders-Files/ORDER__of_Provisional_Measur
es_African_Union_v_Kenya.pdf.
24
MATT GRAINGER & KATE GEARY, OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, THE NEW FORESTS COMPANY
AND ITS UGANDA PLANTATIONS (2011), available at http://www.redd-monitor.org/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/2011/09/cs-new-forest-company-uganda-plantations-220911-en.pdf. The
authors of this report estimate that 22,500 people in Uganda were evicted as part of this
program. Id. at 3.
25
FEMINIST ACTIVIST COALITION (FEMACT), FEMACT LOLIONDO FINDINGS 3, 8 (2009),
available at http://letstalklandtanzania.com/s/loliondo-femact-eviction-fact-finding-report/#.U
XXfTyv72p0.
21
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While indigenous groups fight to protect their customary practices,
feminists have criticized the gendered norms driving many customary
practices, which deprive women of many rights, including access to land.26
Under customary law, women typically have fewer rights than men in
marriage, and have extremely limited rights of inheritance.27 With little to no
access to family or marital property, women’s rights to land are limited.
Women also lack opportunity to meaningfully participate as decision makers
or leaders in customary systems. Many African feminists have preferred
state law to customary law, seeing in it greater opportunity to achieve
equality.28 Still, as customary laws and practices persist, and as recognition
of customary tenure is touted as a means of protecting against land grabs,
many scholars note the need for governments to embrace customary tenure.
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
The languages of the international indigenous rights framework and the
international women’s rights framework29 reflect the opposing positions of
the customary law debate, and thus are directly at odds with one another.
Whereas the former emphasizes the protection of cultural institutions and
group rights, the latter calls on state institutions to alter norms and practices,
essentially mandating state interference. Neither adequately responds to the
socioeconomic and cultural problems facing indigenous women. While the
international indigenous rights framework emphasizes respect for cultural
institutions and cultural authority, it does not delve deeply into women’s lack
of rights relative to men under traditional norms. On the other hand, while
the international women’s rights framework focuses exclusively on the legal
empowerment of women, it privileges the state to a degree that may serve to
disenfranchise rural women living under customary systems.

26

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
28
Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 90.
29
I do not suggest that certain domestic human rights groups around the world have been
unable to address the issues of women’s rights and indigenous rights in a manner that avoids
some of the shortcomings described in this section. However, the discourses of international
indigenous rights and international women’s rights are at odds with one another and, at both
an international and domestic level, can lead to a feeling a disenfranchisement in women
generally by the former framework, and in indigenous women by the latter framework.
27
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A. International and Regional Indigenous Rights Frameworks
Indigenous rights language, included in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the non-binding United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration),
emphasizes the rights of “peoples” to “self-determination” and the ability to
“freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources.”30 With respect to land,
the Declaration calls on states to “give legal recognition and protection to
these lands . . . with due respect to the . . . land tenure systems of the
indigenous peoples concerned.”31 The non-binding Declaration also states
that indigenous peoples have, inter alia, “the right to autonomy or selfgovernment in matters relating to their internal and local affairs,”32 “the right
to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and
cultural institutions,”33 and “the right to own, use, develop and control the
lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional
ownership.”34 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination also applies to indigenous groups, and the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the CERD
Committee)
calls upon States parties to recognize and protect the rights of
indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their
communal lands, territories and resources and, where they have
been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned
or otherwise inhabited or used without their free and informed
consent, to take steps to return those lands and territories.35

30
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 3, G.A.
Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
31
UNDRIP, supra note 30, art. 26(3).
32
Id. art. 4.
33
Id. art. 5.
34
Id. art. 26(2).
35
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXIII:
On the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶¶ 1, 5, U.N. Doc. A/52/18 (1997).
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Regionally, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the
Banjul Charter) similarly grants “peoples” the right to self-determination,36
the right to “freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources,”37 and the
right to “their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to
their freedom and identity.”38 The Working Group on Indigenous
Populations/Communities in Africa (the Working Group), a special
mechanism of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, was
tasked in part with identifying who exactly qualifies as “indigenous” or
“peoples” in sub-Saharan Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, the right to selfdetermination was historically framed in terms of decolonization and the
right of peoples to self-govern an independent state. The “peoples” in that
context were the-then colonized peoples, now the citizens of the various subSaharan states. As such, the term “indigenous” is now contested by those
who argue that all Africans are indigenous,39 and that the term is an
anachronism of subjugation created by European colonists.40 The Working
Group has argued that the term indigenous in the African context must apply
to groups whose cultures and livelihoods differ from the dominant groups in
society, whose “cultures are under threat,” and for which “survival of their
particular way of life depends on access and rights to their traditional lands
and natural resources thereon.”41
Despite the contestation over the term, the conversation in sub-Saharan
Africa has effectively moved from the topic of independence to topics of
self-governance, protection of livelihoods, and protection of resources of
hunter-gatherer and pastoralist groups. The UN special rapporteur on the
rights of indigenous people has reported on the loss of land and resources of
36
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 20, adopted June 27, 1981,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
37
Id. art. 21.
38
Id. art. 22.
39
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN AFRICA: THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLES? 12 (2006), available at http://
www.achpr.org/files/special-mechanisms/indigenous-populations/achpr_wgip_report_summa
ry_version_eng.pdf [hereinafter THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLES].
40
In a statement to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Tanzanian
representative Ramadhan M. Mwinyi asserted that the term indigenous was used to “belittle”
communities during the colonial period. Press Release, United Nations Economic and Social
Council, Chronic Marginalization, Fragmentation, Encroachment, Lack of Land Rights Make
Pastoralists in Africa Among Poorest in World: Intergovernmental Organizations, United
Nations Agencies Weigh in on Relationship between Governments, Pastoralists, UN Press
Release HR/5135 (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/hr5
135.doc.htm.
41
THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLES, supra note 39, at 10.
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tribal groups or sub-groups within African nation states, rather than the entire
native population of said states.42 The Working Group has detailed the
various rights violations experienced by hunter-gatherers, pastoralists, and
agro-pastoralists, asserting that the loss of land and access to resources
caused by the creation of conservation areas and the activities of extractive
industries amounts to violations of peoples’ rights to recover their access to
natural resources and to economic, social, and cultural development.43 Even
more daunting is the threat of extinction faced by certain hunter-gatherer
groups, violating peoples’ “right to existence” guaranteed by the Banjul
Charter.44
To protect against encroachment on lands or other resources, the
commonly proposed solution calls for government recognition of communal
land rights and the creation of consultation requirements. In its general
recommendation 23, the CERD Committee requires that “no decisions
directly relating to [indigenous peoples’] rights and interests [be] taken
without their informed consent.”45 This duty to consult is also articulated by
the International Labour Organization (ILO) in its Convention No. 169,46 by
the Human Rights Committee,47 and the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights
of indigenous peoples.48 Most recently, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights held that this duty to consult has become “a general principle of
international law.”49 The idea that indigenous groups have a right to be
42

See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, The Situation of
Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of the Congo, ¶¶ 7–9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.5
(July 11, 2011) (by James Anaya) (discussing the rights of the ethnic groups more commonly
known as “Pygmies” in the Republic of Congo); Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous People, The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Botswana, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/15/37/Add.2 (July 19, 2010) (by James Anaya).
43
REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS ON INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS/COMMUNITIES 20 (2005), available at http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publica
tions_files/African_Commission_book.pdf.
44
Id.
45
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 35, ¶ 4(d).
46
Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries art. 6(1)(b), June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter Convention No. 169].
47
Human Rights Comm., General Comment 23, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5
(Apr. 8, 1994).
48
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Extractive Industries Operating
Within or Near Indigenous Territories, ¶ 79, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35 (2011) (by James
Anaya).
49
Lisi Brunner & Karla Quintana, The Duty to Consult in the Inter-American System: Legal
Standards After Sarayaku, ASIL INSIGHTS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/
insight121128.pdf (internal quotations omitted).
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consulted has taken hold beyond the rights community, and has begun to
impact the behaviors of actors working outside of human rights. The
International Finance Corporation, for example, strengthened its
Sustainability Framework with respect to indigenous peoples by explicitly
calling on clients to engage in “Informed Consultation and Participation”
with indigenous peoples affected by a project.50
However, even to the extent consultations are occurring, in Africa,
women’s voices within those consultations lack consideration. In a
comprehensive report examining land grabs in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali,
Mozambique, Senegal, and Tanzania, Oxfam notes that women’s voices are
marginalized in consultations, both resulting from and contributing to their
tenure insecurity.51 Women’s issues fail to be adequately represented in
these consultations, due in part to unequal power dynamics that deny women
a meaningful voice in group decision-making or that relegate women as
secondary users of land that is ultimately controlled by men.52 In some
instances, consultations or land deals result in land that is underused,
unproductive, or otherwise “marginal” being taken for the purpose of
allowing investors to improve the seemingly useless land.53 However, these
lands are sometimes the only lands available to and set aside for women who
are widowed or divorced, and taking such land deprives these women of their
strongest rights to land.54
The “woman question” in light of protecting indigenous land rights has
been acknowledged by global human rights bodies, although not very
strongly. The ILO Convention 169 points out that indigenous peoples “have
the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not
incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system
and with internationally recognized human rights.”55 The Declaration
explicitly specifies that the rights contained therein apply to both males and

50
International Finance Corporation, Performance Standard 7: Indigenous Peoples (Jan. 1
2012), available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a79139b845faa8c6a831
2a/PS7_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
51
See TINYADE KACHIKA, OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, LAND GRABBING IN AFRICA: A REVIEW
OF THE IMPACTS AND THE POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES, http://www.oxfamblogs.org/eastafrica/
wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Land-Grabbing-in-Africa.-Final.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2013).
52
Id. at 10–11.
53
Id. at 22.
54
Id. at 44.
55
Convention No. 169, supra note 46, art. 8 (emphasis added).
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females,56 and the special rapporteur, in its mandate, is invited “to take into
account a gender perspective while in carrying out her/his mandate, paying
special attention to discrimination against indigenous women.”57 On the
other hand, although the various UN mechanisms on indigenous rights are
consistently on-message about prior and informed consultation with
indigenous groups, the importance of considering indigenous women in these
consultations gets only sporadic attention. The special rapporteur’s annual
reports do not make explicit mention of the need to include women in
consultations or consider how to improve women’s access to land.58 In
56
UNDRIP, supra note 30, art. 44 (“All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are
equally guaranteed to male and female indigenous individuals.”).
57
Comm. on Human Rights Res. 2001/57, Human Rights and Indigenous Issues, 57th
Sess., March 19–April 27, 1001, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/57,
at 2 (Apr. 24, 2001).
58
Of the ten annual/thematic reports published since 2008, only one discusses women’s
issues at any significant length. In his 2012 report, Special Rapporteur James Anaya discusses
at length the issue of violence against indigenous women and girls, tying it to the
discrimination and inequality faced by indigenous peoples generally. Special Rapporteur on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶¶ 21–28, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/47 (July 6, 2012) (by
James Anaya). Although the general term “violence against women” is easily inclusive of
structural violence—that is, the unequal distribution of wealth and power, including land
when it is a source of both—the report is not specific about the types of violence the UN
system should address with respect to indigenous women. Anaya’s recommended solution
involves strengthening indigenous institutions to adequately address violence against women,
with no specific mention of the need to include women in developing and implementing
institutional solutions, although he does note that “indigenous peoples must challenge and
combat any existing patriarchal social structures, continued attitudes of superiority of men
over women and supposed justifications based on culture for battering or discriminating
against women.” Id. ¶¶ 29–33. Interestingly, immediately after this discussion, Anaya
discusses his continuing work on the rights of indigenous people in relation to extractive
industries, where he makes no mention of indigenous women’s ability to access land and
natural resources. Id. ¶¶ 34–76. In addition, while he emphasizes the need to consult with
indigenous peoples and consider the impact of extractive industries on their lifestyles, he does
not call for the inclusion of women in such consultations. Id. In three earlier reports
mentioning women, Anaya refers to indigenous women primarily to note where they are
mentioned in his mandate and in the indigenous rights legal framework, briefly mentioning
that the Declaration requires indigenous institutions to pay particular attention to the needs of
women, and to discuss global efforts to reduce violence against indigenous women. Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Second International Decade of the World’s
Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/64/338 (Sept. 4, 2009) (by James Anaya); Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Promotion and Protection of all Human
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (July 15, 2009) (by James Anaya); Special Rapporteur
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N.
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country-specific reports, the special rapporteur has reacted positively to
indigenous women’s advocacy and efforts among groups to include women
in decision-making processes, but does not in a broader sense actively
advocate for the inclusion of women in consultations or otherwise increase
their access to land.59 It is worth noting that the United Nations Office of the
Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women and the
Secretariat of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
have collaborated to produce a briefing note on Indigenous Women,
advocating for gender consideration and mainstreaming in all indigenous
rights policies and approaches.60 On the one hand, the note identifies
women’s vulnerabilities with respect to land and natural resources and calls
for inclusion of women in consultations.61 On the other hand, it is paltry in
comparison to the overall discourse on indigenous rights. Indeed, other than
the focus on violence against indigenous women, indigenous women appear
to be mere footnotes to the various UN mechanisms on indigenous rights.
B. Formalism in the Women’s Rights Legal Frameworks
In contrast to the indigenous rights framework’s emphasis on utilizing
and strengthening cultural and indigenous institutions, both international law
and domestic African women’s rights activists have privileged the state as
provider and guarantor of rights. Internationally, the language of women’s
human rights emphasizes the state because human rights systems generally
emphasize state accountability and responsibility. Domestically, many
African feminist attorneys have preferred the state to customary structures

Doc. A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 11, 2008) (by James Anaya). Finally, in his most recent report, he
briefly encourages indigenous institutions to develop some gender balance, but does not go
into any greater detail than a two sentence prescription. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Extractive Industries and Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/24/41 (July 1, 2013) (by James Anaya).
59
See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, The Situation of
Kanak People in New Caledonia, France, ¶¶ 90–91, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.6 (Nov.
23, 2011) (by James Anaya); Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Report
on the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Nepal, ¶ 95, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34/Add.3 (July
20, 2009) (by James Anaya).
60
U.N. Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women and
the Secretariat of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Gender and
Indigenous Peoples (2010), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/Briefing%20Not
es%20Gender%20and%20Indigenous%20Women.pdf.
61
Id. at 8–10.
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for the promotion of women’s rights,62 pushing for the eradication of
customary tenure.63 This reliance on state-centered approaches has been
criticized for ignoring both the disenfranchisement of certain women at the
hands of the state and the role that customary law plays in African women’s
lives.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (the CEDAW) throughout its text calls for state action to
protect women’s rights, and relies upon structures of the formal legal system.
The CEDAW calls on States Parties to “adopt appropriate legislative and
other measures,” and “establish legal protection of the rights of women.”64
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol) also calls on States Parties
to “enact and effectively implement appropriate legislative or regulatory
measures, including those prohibiting and curbing all forms of
discrimination. . . .”65 To the extent it refers to cultural and customary
practices, the CEDAW requires elimination or modification of those
practices that discriminate against women.66 The Maputo Protocol similarly
calls on States Parties to reform “existing discriminatory laws and practices
in order to promote and protect the rights of women,”67 and also goes further
by calling for the prohibition of specific customary practices.68 Article 21 of
the Maputo Protocol provides very specific rights with respect to land and
property, providing that widows have the right to inherit property from their
husbands, the right to remain in the marital home after their husbands’
deaths, “and ‘the right to inherit, in equitable shares, their parents’
properties.’ ”69
When confronted with specific customary law norms negatively
impacting women, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
62
Ambreena S. Manji, Imagining Women’s ‘Legal World’: Towards a Feminist Theory of
Legal Pluralism in Africa, 8 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 435, 440 (1999); Whitehead & Tsikata,
supra note 9, at 90.
63
Aili Mari Tripp, Women’s Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in Africa: The
Case of Uganda, 7 AFR. STUD. Q. 1, 2 (2004).
64
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 2,
Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
65
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa art. 2(1)(b), Sept. 13, 2000, reprinted in 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 40 [hereinafter
Maputo Protocol].
66
CEDAW, supra note 64, pmbl. & arts. 2(f), 5(a).
67
Maputo Protocol, supra note 65, art. 8(f).
68
Id. arts. 2(2), 5.
69
Id. art. 21.
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Against Women (the CEDAW Committee) has called for state action to
eliminate these norms. In Zambia, the CEDAW Committee expressed
concern over the fact that both statutory and customary law governed
marriage and family relations, noting that “customary law is mostly
unwritten and often administered by male justices without a legal
background, and that discrimination against women is not addressed in their
decisions.”70 It suggested that customary law be both revised and codified.71
Similarly in Uganda, the Committee expressed “concern that customs and
traditional practices, prevalent in rural areas, prevent women from inheriting
or acquiring ownership of land and other property.”72 Tanzania’s customs
were also taken to task for perpetuating discrimination against women, and
the Committee urged Tanzania to “put in place without delay a
comprehensive strategy, including legislation, to modify or eliminate cultural
practices and stereotypes that discriminate against women. . . .”73 To address
the problems women face in customary forms of landholding, the Committee
generally recommends the adoption of laws of intestate succession which
codify the principle of equality as between men and women and limit
discriminatory customary practices.74
Many African women’s rights groups work within the frameworks set out
by international women’s rights law and statutory law. Women’s groups do
work directly with tribal groups to empower women and encourage change
through traditional structures, but there is also a great deal of emphasis
placed on formal legal action. Information gathered from advocacy efforts
and fact-findings in rural areas often forms the basis of shadow reports
70

Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Zambia, U.N. Doc.
A/57/38 (June 21, 2002) ¶ 250, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/do
cs/co/ZambiaCO27.pdf.
71
Id. ¶ 251.
72
Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Uganda,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/UGA/CO/7 (Oct. 22, 2010) ¶ 41, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-C-UGA-CO-7.pdf.
73
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women: United Republic of Tanzania, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/TZA/CO/6 (July 18, 2008)
¶¶ 117–118, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW.C.TZA.
CO.6.pdf.
74
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General recommendation
on article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, ¶¶ 50, 53, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/29 (Feb. 26, 2013).
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submitted to the CEDAW Committee and other human rights bodies. In
addition to working with various international human rights bodies, women’s
groups have also focused on state judicial and legislative action. Succession
under customary law, for example, has been the subject of lawsuits in
Botswana,75 Tanzania,76 and South Africa,77 among others.
This state-philic approach has been criticized as being phallocentric in its
reliance on a legal centralist model78 and hegemonic in its reliance on
western-style systems.79 That is, by working within the parameters of the
state and focusing on outcomes produced by formal state institutions, these
activists are accused of continuing to operate within a patriarchal model and
failing to take into account the lived realities of certain women. Despite
these accusations, many women do have a preference for state court systems
and statutory law, in part because they anticipate better results from the state
system. Additionally, the women’s human rights framework in international
and regional treaties is meant to include all women, including those in
indigenous or rural communities.
Yet while some women have indicated a preference for statutory courts
over customary institutions,80 others found no comfort in the statutory law of
the colonial and post-colonial African state, which served to codify
75
Ramantele v. Mmusi, [2013] BWCA 1 (Bots.), available at http://www.southernafricalitiga
tioncentre.org/1/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Mmusi-Court-of-Appeal-Judgment.pdf (providing
that Ngwaketse customary law of inheritance, which traditionally only permitted intestate
succession of a parent’s estate to male heirs, should be interpreted to reflect modern views and
applied to permit female children to inherit parents’ property intestate).
76
Ephraim v. Pastory, [2001] AHRLR 236 (HC) (Tanz.) (holding that the sale of clan land
by a female was valid, in spite of the Haya customary law which prohibited women from
inheriting and selling clan land); Stephen & Charles v. Attorney-General, Miscellaneous Civil
Cause No. 82 of 2005 (HC) (Tanz.) (unreported) (acknowledging that customary law
prohibiting women from inheriting and selling clan land was discriminatory, but refusing to
strike it down nonetheless).
77
Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/
za/cases/ZACC/2004/17.html (holding the African customary law of male primogeniture, to
the extent it excludes women and extra-marital children from inheriting under intestate
succession, is unconstitutional and invalid).
78
Manji, supra note 62, at 439–40 (“The feminist focus on the state has meant that in both
the west and in emerging third world feminist theorisation, law reform has taken pride of
place on the agenda of feminist groups . . . Arthurs has argued convincingly . . . that the
reliance on the constitution is the epitome of legal centralism. . . .”).
79
Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural
Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381, 393–
94 (2000) (noting that the abolitionist approach, which favors statutory law over custom, has
been accused of cultural imperialism).
80
Tripp, supra note 63, at 10.
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oppression of women for many years.81 Not only was statutory law
providing no new protections, in some ways it was even defraying the
limited protections women had under customary law. The customary system
of laws, on the other hand, was both more familiar and perceived as more
legitimate. Critics, characterizing the state-centered approach as abolitionist,
argue that it fails to acknowledge the dynamic nature of customary rights,
and the possibility that there may be a place for human rights norms within a
customary construct.82
In addition, for some indigenous women, effective remedies cannot
necessarily be provided by mechanisms at the center. Women who use
formal courts are sometimes seen as betraying their cultural values.83 Some
women find that to ensure their actions are perceived as legitimate, it is in
their best interest to use traditional settlement mechanisms that are
acceptable to the men in their community.84 Furthermore, formal courts may
not be as accessible to women as local village-level bodies, and the use of
formal courts is accompanied by time and money costs.
Women’s preferences for state-supported or customary structures are
mixed, complicating the discussion of what is the best system to protect
women’s rights. However, just as customary tenure persists because of its
legitimacy and relevance to certain groups, so are customary institutions
more palatable for certain groups of women. From this perspective, an
approach of engagement, rather than eradication, is necessary.
IV. THE GENDERED DIFFICULTIES OF CUSTOMARY AND STATUTORY LAW
Customary tenure and statutory law, acting both separately and together,
have failed women. For women, access to land under customary tenure is
limited. Despite the variation of customary norms across groups, many
scholars have noted some consistent similarities in women’s rights: women’s
rights to land are dependent on their connection to family, typically to the
men in the family. As competition for land increased, even the limited
protections women were afforded began to be rejected by men and traditional
authorities. The arrival of statutory law has unfortunately reinforced
discriminatory norms and, in some ways, made them even more
discriminatory. Although historically under customary law, women’s rights
81
82
83
84

See discussion infra IV.B.
Nyamu, supra note 79.
Manji, supra note 62, at 449.
Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 99.
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were inferior to men’s rights, women did maintain some limited rights
relating to land. Colonial and post-colonial laws established norms that
ignored these nuances, eliminating the rights women did have.
A. Women’s Rights Under Pre-Colonial Customary Tenure
Customary tenure systems privilege the needs of the household and
community over the needs of the individual. Given the gender-specific roles
that exist in these communities, the rights of men and women were, and still
are, different. Land typically passed from male to male within a household;
if the household line ended, the land would revert back to the community.
Women typically had rights to access and cultivate land. Each community’s
practices were determined by the needs of the community and any other
factors relating to the practice. Customary tenure is thus, in theory, dynamic
and flexible, adapting to changes in the environment and changes in
community views.
Certain gendered practices seem to be common across groups. All rights
are tied to kinship networks, and a woman’s rights are based on the men in
her life. Land flows through the male members of households. With some
exceptions and varying degrees of nuance, customary tenure tends to
conform to the following practices.85 During their lifetimes, women are able
to access land through their fathers or male relatives and, later, through their
husbands.86 If a woman remains unmarried, her father, brother, uncle, or
other male relative will ensure that she has access to some land.87 If she does
marry and later becomes widowed, she does not necessarily inherit the
matrimonial property outright.88 If she has young children, she may stay in
85

Although there are many common gendered practices under customary law, it cannot be
overstated that not all customary systems are the same. Authors have found examples where
women were, at least at one point, able to inherit land alongside men under some forms of
customary tenure. E.g., Ingrid Yngstrom, Women, Wives and Land Rights in Africa: Situating
Gender Beyond the Household in the Debate Over Land Policy and Changing Tenure
Systems, 30 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 21, 30 (2002).
86
Sandra Joireman, Entrapment or Freedom: Enforcing Customary Property Rights
Regimes in Common-Law Africa, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 302
(Jeanmarie Fenrich et al. eds., 2011); Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, Impact of Privatization on
Gender and Property Rights in Africa, 25 WORLD DEV. 1317, 1322–23 (1997) (noting that in
Ghana, daughters have cultivation rights to parcels of the land of their natal families, losing
that right when their fathers die, but gaining cultivation rights to their husbands’ land when
they marry).
87
Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 86, at 1321–22.
88
Id. at 1322.
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the matrimonial home to raise them until her sons are of age to manage the
property.89 If she does not, in some communities she may marry a relative of
her husband and continue to stay on the land.90 Otherwise, she can return
home to her father or brothers, who will provide her with property.91
Several authors argue that these customary protections were once very
strong; women never went without access to land because customary norms
granting access were so heavily tied to customary norms of fairness and
justice.92 However, even if these protections were as strong as is claimed, it
was during a time when there was less demand on land93 and land did not
suffer from the competition created by demographic pressures, the rise of
cash crops, and competing interests in a global economy.
B. Women and Customary Tenure in the Colonial and Post-Colonial State
Under the colonial state, customary leaders and elites twisted norms to
their own benefit. During the colonial era, colonial governments amplified
the role of traditional chiefs.94 Colonial governments, even when applying a
formal property system to white settlers, attempted to identify and apply
customary “rules” of tenure to native Africans. In seeking to assess the
nature of customary tenure, colonial governments sought out traditional
authorities,95 who inevitably presented their own versions of the customary
rules.96 This emphasis on traditional authorities as sources of law allowed
these traditional authorities to assert an even greater level of control over
women, younger men, and children than had been previously experienced by
89

Id.
Aparna Polavarapu, Procuring Meaningful Land Rights for the Women of Rwanda, 14
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 105, 110 (2011).
91
For discussions of women’s rights under customary tenure in different countries, see id.
(discussing customary tenure in Rwanda); Dr. Ben Kiromba Twinomugisha, African
Customary Law and Women’s Human Rights in Uganda, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN
CUSTOMARY LAW 453–55 (Jeanmarie Fenrich et al. eds., 2011) (discussing women’s rights
under customary tenure in Uganda); Tripp, supra note 63, at 6 (describing customary land
tenure in Uganda, noting that men are able, but not obligated, to leave land to women);
Joireman, supra note 86, at 302–04 (discussing, in both the text and footnotes, societies in
West Africa, Uganda, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, among others).
92
Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 78.
93
Joireman, supra note 86, at 303.
94
Id. at 297; Manji, supra note 62, at 445; Polavarapu, supra note 90, at 109.
95
Where there were no traditional authorities, the colonial state appointed one. Joireman,
supra note 86, at 297.
96
Id. at 297–98.
90
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local communities.97 Both colonial governments and tribal authorities were
concerned about women’s migration to urban centers, the latter particularly
because it threatened the customary political authority.98 As a means of
controlling and stemming this flow, colonial governments enacted legislation
empowering chiefs to control women’s movements and, later, marriage and
other personal laws, further increasing male control over women.99 Under
some governments, these unwritten rules became written, reflecting the
European preference for written codes. The codification of these “customary
rules” stunted the development and undermined the flexibility of customary
law, rigidifying norms through legislation while granting traditional
authorities the unprecedented power to create customary law by their
word.100
Post-colonial governments have also been complicit in reinforcing norms
depriving women of rights and limiting norms that granted women rights.
After independence, the modern African state began implementing westernstyle formal land reforms, promoting individual ownership and titling.
Influential international actors heavily supported this approach, considering
such reform to be a key driver of economic development, legal clarity, and
conflict resolution.101 In their first iteration, these land reforms served to
exclude women from any rights whatsoever with respect to land. Titling
programs formalized title under the names of “heads of households,” who
were men.102 Under such a system of formal title, private, individual rights
of ownership were privileged over social normative rules, and women’s use
rights became increasingly insecure.103
Scholars have consistently argued that western models of tenure could not
comprehend the “corporate tenure” that tended to characterize customary
forms. Platteau, for example, has argued that,
[u]pholders of the “static” view have ignored or downplayed
the dynamic potential of indigenous African land systems
partly because they have failed to see that individual tenures
can exist under a general system of corporate ownership; that
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 297.
Manji, supra note 62, at 444–45.
Id. at 445.
Joireman, supra note 86, at 298.
Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 80–81.
Nyamu, supra note 79, at 396.
Id.; Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 73.
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communal arrangements are genuine multi-tenure systems with
different land uses calling for different tenures; and that landuse rights, most often to a specific plot of land, are held by
individuals or households. Such systems are flexible enough to
allow the proportion of lands held under relatively well-secured
rights of individual possession to increase as the need arises for
agricultural intensification and the accompanying long-term
investments.104
Western conceptualizations understood this as ownership, from which other,
lesser rights could be granted.
The western conceptualization is incomplete in that it does not
incorporate the customary social structures which require, rather than permit,
differing land rights to various groups, especially considering the needs of
the community. Women, for example, were heavily involved in cultivation
and, thus, the community depended on women having access to land:
In a context where labour is frequently a key limiting factor of
production, and where women can and do provide a significant
share of this, especially in terms of household food
provisioning, the obligation by men to acknowledge their
wives’ contribution and to provide land for food is critical to
the farming and household enterprise.105
The conjugal contract thus incorporated access to land in a way that western
perceptions of “ownership” and “usufruct” do not. The impact of formal
titling processes was to deprive women of these rights altogether: men as the
primary decision-makers were understood to be “heads of household” and
were given complete control over land plots, reducing the influence of
community norms of fairness and justice which required granting access to
women.106 Thus, women’s rights, which were once all but guaranteed,
became truly usufructory. Lastarria-Cornhiel offers a similar conclusion: “It
is under the increasing transformation of customary tenure systems to
market-based, individualized tenure systems that women’s limited but

104
Jean-Philippe Platteau, The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to SubSaharan Africa: A Critical Assessment, 27 DEV. & CHANGE 29, 33 (1996).
105
Yngstrom, supra note 85, at 27.
106
Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 74.
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recognized land rights may be ignored and consequently lost.”107 The titling
process encouraged clan groups to limit women’s access to title in order to
keep land within the family.108 In Kenya, for example, even where titling
schemes were open to both the men and women in a household, male Kikuyu
did not permit landholdings to be titled in women’s names because it would
be subversive to the social structure.109 Formal courts have also denied
women’s informal rights to lands after land was titled. The Kenyan Court of
Appeals, for example, denied a woman’s customary law-based claims to
titled land, holding that the title registration extinguished a wife’s right of
access.110
The post-colonial state also preserved certain aspects of customary norms
to the detriment of women. Many early constitutions excepted customary
law from being bound by constitutional provisions granting citizens the right
to be free from discrimination and the right to equal protection under the
law.111 Even as these clawback clauses were struck from constitutions,112
107

Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 86, at 1329.
Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 74.
109
Id. at 97–98 (citing Mackenzie).
110
Nyamu, supra note 79, at 407 (citing to Wanjohi v. Official Receiver and Interim
Liquidator, a 1988 Kenyan Court of Appeals decision).
111
E.g., CONSTITUTION, art. 33(5)(d) (1997) (reprinted 2002) (Gambia); CONSTITUTION, art.
82(4)(b)–(c) (1963) (amended 2008) (Kenya); CONSTITUTION, art. 18(4)(c) (1993) (Lesotho).
Each of these provisions contains language carving out a customary law exception for the
otherwise constitutionally-guaranteed right to equal protection under the law. The pre-2010
Kenyan Constitution, for example, states in article 82(1) that “[s]ubject to subsections (4), (5)
and (8), no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.”
Article 82(4) goes on to state,
Subsection (1) shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes
provision—
...
(b) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property
on death or other matters of personal law;
(c) for the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe of
customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with
respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons. . . .
112
The current constitution of Kenya no longer contains a clawback provision for the benefit
of customary law. Moreover, it makes clear that customary law must comply with
constitutional guarantees: “Any law, including customary law, that is inconsistent with this
Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission in
contravention of this Constitution is invalid.” CONSTITUTION, art. 2(4) (2010) (Kenya). With
respect to equality, however, this constitution is by no means perfect: it explicitly qualifies the
provisions on equality for certain applications of Muslim personal law. CONSTITUTION, art.
24(c)(4) (2010) (Kenya) (providing, “[t]he provisions of this Chapter on equality shall be
qualified to the extent strictly necessary for the application of Muslim law before the Kadhis’
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some statutory laws continued to permit customary law to govern personal
matters, such as inheritance, marriage, divorce, and burial rites. The result
has been that even when statutory law granted women equal or even simply
improved rights to land, under customary law as applied, women’s access to
land, which was typically governed by laws of inheritance, marriage, and
divorce, remained limited.
In Tanzania, for example, the Indian Succession Act grants women equal
property rights, but customary law is applied to certain specified
communities.113 Schedules to the Judicature and Application of Laws Act
contain codifications of the customary law to clarify the exact rules to be
applied. Under this law, a barren widow receives one twentieth of one half
of the immovable marital property and may live in the marital home until her
remarriage or death.114 A widow who bore her husband children may reside
in the marital home with her children, but may be asked to leave if she lives
with a man who is not her deceased husband’s relative.115 The codified
customary law of inheritance severely limits women’s ability to inherit clan
land while any male heir lives, stating: “[w]omen are allowed to inherit
except clan land. They can use clan land without selling it during their
lifetime. But if there are no men in that clan, a woman can inherit this land
completely.”116 Similarly, Kenya’s Law of Succession provides that the
customary law of succession shall apply in specified districts in the country,
with respect to agricultural land and livestock.117 While Kenya’s customary
law has not been codified the way Tanzania’s has, it has been unofficially
codified in the Restatement of African Law, which judges access when
attempting to ascertain customary law.118 At least some statutory courts have
courts, to persons who profess the Muslim religion, in matters relating to personal status,
marriage, divorce and inheritance.”).
113
Judicature and Application of Laws Act, 2002, c. 358, § 11 (Tanz.). For a discussion of
how the various laws on succession work together, see Tamar Ezer, Inheritance Law in
Tanzania: The Impoverishment of Widows and Daughters, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 599, 606–
08 (2006).
114
Local Customary Law (Declaration) Order, Government Notice (GN) 279/1963,
Schedule 1, Laws of Persons [Sheria Zinazohosu Hali ya Watu] rule 77, in Judicature and
Application of Laws Act (Subsidiary Legis.), 2002, C. 358 (Tanz.).
115
Id. at rules 66A, 68.
116
Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4) Order, Government Notice (GN) 436/1963,
Schedule 2, Laws of Inheritance [Sheria za Urithi] rule 20, in Judicature and Application of
Laws Act (Subsidiary Legis.), 2002, c. 358 (Tanz.).
117
The Law of Succession Act, (2008) Cap. 160 §§ 32–33 (Kenya).
118
For example, in a 2004 High Court of Kenya case involving an inheritance dispute under
Kikuyu law, the judge cited to Eugene Cotran’s Restatement of African Law, published in
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refused to apply discriminatory customary norms, relying on statutory
“repugnancy tests” which permit application of customary law only insofar
as it is not “repugnant to justice and morality.”119 However, this approach
has not had the impact of altering the rigidified customary law or creating a
more egalitarian customary law. The existing legal pluralism has created
rifts between urban women, who were more likely to benefit from statutory
law, and rural women, who continued to be governed by customary law.
Although South Africa has embraced the concept of a “living customary
law,” in which norms are capable of being redefined by negotiation, which
can work to the benefit of women, it has also continued to consolidate
customary authority in men, who benefit from the status quo. The
Communal Land Rights Act, which was declared unconstitutional in 2010,120
consolidated communal land rights authority in traditional councils.121 In
doing so, it had been criticized as creating unfavorable conditions for women
to negotiate for land rights.122 The Traditional Courts Bill, still in
Parliament, is criticized as doing the same by granting all-male traditional
councils the ability to determine the substance of customary norms.123
The list goes on. The hybrid systems that currently exist continue to
entrench discriminatory norms and deny women rights.

1968, to support the grant of land to an unmarried daughter of a Kikuyu man. Kaguara v.
Mburu, Civil Case 648 of 2004 (Kenya), available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/
view/14637/. The language cited by the judge states:
Inheritance under Kikuyu Law is patrilineal. The pattern of inheritance is
based on the equal distribution of a man’s property among his sons, subject to
the proviso that the eldest son may get a slightly larger share. Daughters are
normally excluded, but may also receive a share if they remain unmarried. In
the absence of sons the heirs are the nearest patrilineal relatives of the
deceased, namely father, full brother, half-brothers and paternal Uncles.
Id.
119
See, e.g., The Judicature Act (1967) Cap. 8 § 3(2) (Kenya) (providing that, “[courts] shall
be guided by African customary law in civil cases in which one or more of the parties is
subject to it or affected by it, so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and
morality or inconsistent with any written law.”).
120
LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE, Communal Land Right Act Declared Unconstitutional (May
11, 2010), http://www.lrc.org.za/press-releases/1227-2010-05-11-communal-land-right-act-decl
ared-unconstitutional.
121
Claassens & Mnisi, supra note 10, at 494.
122
Id. at 509–10.
123
Id. at 511; South Africa: Minister Condemns Silencing of Women During Traditional
Courts Bill Hearings, ALLAFRICA.COM, May 20, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/20120521
0023.html.
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Where customary law is not codified but still able to be flexible and
dynamic, it is not necessarily changing for the better. While there are some
examples of women negotiating within the customary framework to improve
their rights, there are also examples in which women are unable to do so.124
Women continue to struggle more than men to access land,125 and existing
women’s protections under customary law face serious obstacles.
Customary systems have been breaking down due to external factors which,
in combination with privatization, have led to women losing their rights.126
Over time, norms protecting women have broken down as resources become
scarcer and as the monetary value of certain cash crops changes incentives.
Where demographic pressure has increased stress on and demand for land,
men began to cast off the protections they owe women.127 In some instances,
such demographic pressure has resulted in traditional authorities
manipulating norms to remove the protections traditionally afforded to
weaker groups, with women becoming more likely to lose out on land.128
Where urbanization created an increased demand for food, men have
recaptured rights to cultivate land in order to capture the increased value of
food production.129
In addition to environmental changes, state governments have supported
the exclusion of women from customary protections. Throughout the
continent, alliances have developed between male political leaders and
traditional chiefs130 in a way that mimics the consolidation of tribal authority
implemented by the colonial state. In political discourse, the term customary
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Claassens & Mnisi, supra note 10, at 502; Joireman, supra note 86, at 304; Whitehead &
Tsikata, supra note 10, at 102.
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Joireman, supra note 86, at 304; Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 102.
126
Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 86, at 1324–25; Abdulmumini A. Oba, The Future of
Customary Law in Africa, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 12, at 58,
71.
127
Catherine André, Rwandan Land: Access, Policy & Land Reform 12 (Antwerp
University, Centre for Development Studies, Working Paper Series 29, 1998), available at
http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/1450.pdf; Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 86, at 1328–29
(noting that in Africa, customary tenure systems were no longer capable of providing women
with access to sufficient land, due to factors such as land scarcity, HIV/AIDS, increasing
poverty, and commercial agriculture).
128
Joireman, supra note 86, at 306; Tripp, supra note 63, at 2.
129
CHANGES IN “CUSTOMARY” LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 20–21 (Lorenzo Cotula
ed., 2007).
130
Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 101.

2013]

RECONCILING INDIGENOUS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS TO LAND

119

has been appropriated to serve the best interests of the traditional elders and
to further sex discrimination.131
As protection of customary land tenure becomes an increasingly accepted
policy measure to protect against unlawful land grabs, women’s activists
must be willing to engage with customary law to protect women’s rights.
Importantly, even if customary forms of tenure are to be protected, the
hybrid statutory-customary law systems that exist cannot be permitted to
continue. Such systems fail dramatically at protecting women, and while
some engagement with customary systems seems necessary, legal protection
of indigenous rights and customary law must better enhance and protect the
rights of women.
V. A SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE FOR BOTH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
WOMEN?
Any system of governance that will simultaneously protect indigenous
groups and the women within those groups will be subversive of existing
power structures. The suggestion that governments engage with and
strengthen customary systems of land ownership is subversive in its own
way, as it seeks to direct power from the government and wealthy urban
groups to indigenous, often rural groups. Land in particular is an area in
which governments prefer to retain control, as it is the gateway to accessing
Africa’s much sought-after natural resources. Inducing gender equality
requires another layer of subversiveness, ensuring that the power within the
indigenous groups does not remain concentrated in elder male elites but
disperses among women and non-elites. Thus, any system of governance
introduced to rectify the vulnerabilities caused by competition for land must
have a certain amount of comfort with disruption.
But what does this disruption look like? What form of legal governance
would protect these groups but also encourage systematic movement toward
gender equality? Any effective governance would need to be endorsed by
the people, in the same way that customary systems are, while still
combating some of the inherently patriarchal norms that permeate customary
systems.
A pure customary approach would be a clear step backward for women.
A key aspect of customary land tenure is that norms are meant to be flexible
and, thus, will change to meet community needs in response to external and
131

Id. at 101–02.
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internal change factors. In theory, this would protect women. As the world
changes, and society changes, groups will change the types of land rights and
responsibilities. Unfortunately, this flexibility, combined with external
factors, has been the cause of the disintegration of the limited rights women
do have in customary systems.132
On the other end of the spectrum, just short of eradicating customary law,
is the full incorporation of the customary system into statutory law by
maintaining the customary trappings of an institution within the formal legal
framework.133 Under this approach, customary institutions are empowered
with certain competencies by statutory law, and are entirely governed by
statutory law. In states where people and customary institutions already
reject statutory systems because they are deemed illegitimate, this more
heavy-handed approach may not gain much traction.
Various approaches to strike the balance between supporting both
indigenous sovereignty and women’s rights include, inter alia, supporting
women who negotiate within the customary law frameworks,134 a critical
pragmatist approach,135 empowering women to participate in customary
decision-making,136 and providing a form of concurrent judicial review of

132

See supra Part IV.B.
The Rwandan government’s approach is a prime example of how customary systems can
be adopted by the formal system and be governed by statute rather than customary law. The
government has “formalized” informal, local institutions such as gacaca, local dispute
resolution bodies, and abunzi, local mediation councils, by codifying their structure and
purpose, as well as holding them accountable to statutory law. Gacaca, for example, began as
an informal system to address inter- or intra-family disputes in Rwanda. After the 1994
genocide, the government considered local level dispute resolution and reconciliation
mechanisms to address crimes committed during the genocide, eventually settling on gacaca.
What began as an informal system was formalized via Organic Law No. 40/2000, which
provides for, inter alia, the jurisdiction, makeup, and competencies of gacaca courts. Organic
Law Setting up “Gacaca Jurisdictions” and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting
the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Between October 1, 1990 and
December 31, 1994, Organic Law No. 40/2000 of Jan. 26, 2001 (Rwanda). For a discussion
of the evolution of gacaca courts, see Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional”
Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 765, 777–89 (2007). The abunzi, similarly, are mediation councils based on traditional
dispute resolution mechanisms and formalized by statutory law, which determines their
powers, make up, and jurisdiction. Organic Law No. 31/2006 of 14/08/2006 on Organisation,
Jurisdiction, Competence and Functioning of the Mediation Committee.
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Claassens & Mnisi, supra note 10, at 494.
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Nyamu, supra note 10, at 26.
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THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 467 (Jeanmarie Fenrich et al. eds., 2011).
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customary decisions.137 Each of these approaches seeks to find ways for
customary institutions to maintain their integrity while engaging with
international and constitutional rights norms. It is my argument that no
approach will work unless the state is willing to fundamentally alter both the
processes and substance of the customary tenure system and hold itself
accountable for the functioning of these customary tenure systems. The
negotiation and critical pragmatist approaches fail to create systematic
change for women, instead allowing for pockets of change to occur for
certain women. Increasing women’s ability to participate in decision-making
or establishing a form of judicial review is a move in the right direction, but
in my view insufficient to create the type of broad change that will
effectively alter women’s rights to land generally. Instead, I advocate for an
approach that draws from these approaches, but also mandates greater state
involvement in decentralized customary land decisions.
A. The Negotiation Method
One approach to improving customary tenure conditions for women
involves supporting women in individually negotiating for land rights within
traditional dispute settlement or negotiation bodies.138 In theory, this
emphasis on negotiation within the system may in fact work better for
women and for community groups than state law, because it would allow
women to meet their needs while still preserving the underlying values of the
customary tenure system. For example, a woman may not wish to inherit her
matrimonial home and land, thus taking her deceased husband’s land away
from his family. Instead, she may negotiate for another item that meets her
needs, such as a small plot of land elsewhere in the community, cultivation
rights to a parcel of land, or a portion of the crop produced. These
negotiations would help shape norms that increasingly recognize women in
different roles and with different land rights. Further, positive outcomes for
women would be afforded greater legitimacy when resulting from
negotiation within the customary system than when resulting from state court
intervention. State law, however, would be an important pillar of support for
these women. Women would be able to rely not only on prior successful
137

David Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural Imperialism? Reinforcing
Customary Justice Through Collateral Review In South Sudan, 2 H.J.R.L. 1 (2010).
138
Claassens & Mnisi, supra note 10, at 493 (“We argue for an approach to rights that
acknowledges their mutable nature and pays attention to processes of contestation around the
content and definition of rights. . . .”).
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negotiations by other women139 but also on constitutional articulations of
rights.140
However, this method alone is unlikely to create systematic change
without additional reforms. Even as there are examples of women
successfully negotiating within clan groups, there are other examples where
women fail.141 Flexible norms will continue to be vulnerable to exploitation
by those in power, just as much as they are open to being contested by
women. In addition, the process of negotiation leaves in place the gender
hierarchy. Women are required to negotiate for access to or ownership of
land, rights for which men either do not need to negotiate or do not face as
much difficulty in negotiating. The system of negotiation merely facilitates
some effective challenges of sex-discriminatory norms, but does not even the
playing field for all women. Furthermore, successful challenges do not
guarantee greater fairness and justice for women going forward. Negotiation
is simply reactive to the male-dominant system, rather than transformative.
B. Critical Pragmatism
Celestine Nyamu, offering up the related approach of “critical
pragmatism,” is fully aware of these drawbacks, but argues that failing to
account for customary law is ineffective.142 Under her pragmatic approach,
both state and customary institutions should incorporate “social controls” to
protect women.143 Nyamu does not reject formal title. She instead argues
that a pragmatic solution would promote a form of title that creates a
responsibility in the titleholder to consider other socially recognized, but
unregistered, property interests.144 She also argues that feminists should
engage with openings within customary law, using opportunities in local and
formal dispute resolution mechanisms to argue for women’s rights of access
or occupancy on the basis of norms of fairness and protection of kin.145 As
she notes, however, “[g]ains for individual women in such circumstances
leave intact the gender hierarchy in landholding and the ineffective spousal
support mechanisms in family law.”146
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id. at 502.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 502.
Nyamu, supra note 79, at 416–17.
Id. at 411–12.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 416.
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Even when this strategy co-exists with a strategy to update and reform
statutory laws, as she suggests,147 I argue that the transformative change
necessary to have long-term equality is not met. On the one hand, it
introduces the flexibility of customary law into the courts, and allows
feminists to argue to courts that even as customary law should be respected,
it must be construed in accordance with the norms of fairness. Courts
embracing this approach are able to demonstrate respect for customary law
while relying on its adaptability to apply it in a fair and equal manner.148
This engagement with customary law translates to engagement with selfdisenfranchised populations who prefer customary law, while still
incorporating norms of fairness and equality. On the other hand, women fail
to gain access to land on par with men via this approach. Rights of use and
access, for which women would assert their claims, are limited in
comparison to rights of ownership and inheritance, which men typically have
under customary law. As with the negotiation approach, just as some cases
may be successful, others will not, and the flexibility of customary norms
can just as easily be used against women. The approach continues to be
reactive because women begin their negotiation from an inferior position.
Although this time in an adversarial setting rather than negotiation, this
gendered power dynamic perpetuates key patriarchal systems of inequality.
C. Increasing Women’s Participation in Decision-Making
A more systematic approach includes increasing the presence of women
in the decision-making councils where norms are negotiated and disputes are
resolved. This, in theory, would allow women to equally shape the normmaking processes inherent in customary law. This is desirable in that it
opens the door for women to actively change the current norm structure. It
may also improve the outcomes of the informed consultations promoted by
indigenous rights activists. The presence of women in decision-making
councils could ensure that any consultations with the government,
businesses, or environmental groups are effectively responsive to women’s
needs. Increasing the diversity of decision-making councils more generally
could similarly increase the participation of other non-elites or households
falling outside the consolidated power of the current decision-makers.
147

Id. at 416–17.
In fact, the Botswana Court of Appeal relied on notions of fairness to construe the
Ngwaketse customary law of inheritance in a manner that treats male and female children
equally. Ramantele v. Mmusi, supra note 75.
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Although not explicitly focused on land, Johanna Bond has suggested a
similar procedural approach to improve women’s status within customary
law. Examining the value of various human rights treaties in developing and
reforming customary law, Bond suggests that feminists take advantage of
Article 17 of the Maputo Protocol,149 which provides specifically for
women’s right to participate in cultural politics.150 Acknowledging that
power dynamics may control the ultimate outcome of such discourse, she
points out that a significant benefit is the engagement of traditional leaders
with international human rights norms.151
Unfortunately, while women in power may and often do advocate for
previously ignored women’s issues, women’s increased presence in political
structures does not always translate to a meaningful presence.152 Many states
in sub-Saharan Africa have constitutionally mandated quotas for women in
their legislative bodies,153 and women’s caucuses have identified and
successfully advocated for legislation addressing a number of key women’s
issues, such as preventing domestic violence and abolishing female genital
mutilation.154 At the same time, parties remain male-dominated, and
governments are reluctant to enact other key pieces of legislation to promote
women’s rights.155 One case study of local Village Councils in Tanzania
149

Bond, supra note 136, at 490–92.
Maputo Protocol, supra note 65, art. 17. The relevant text states: “1. Women shall have
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determination of cultural policies. 2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
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Genital Mutilation Act. Uganda Women’s Parliamentary Assoc., Strategic Plan 2011–2016,
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revealed that, “Women elected to these Councils are unlikely to demonstrate
particular support for women’s land claims.”156 It is also not a foregone
conclusion that women will advocate for women’s rights or that women’s
participation will be meaningful. Presence alone is insufficient.
D. Collateral Review
A more strong-armed approach involves a form of judicial review of
customary decisions. Under a collateral review approach, the state judiciary
would have the ability to review customary decisions not on their merits, but
based on the compliance of the outcome or process with the minimal
constitutional mandates.157 This approach permits customary processes to
maintain primary jurisdiction over certain areas of law, “maximizing” the
role of customary institutions.158 State court jurisdiction would thus be
limited. Because state courts would remand overturned decisions,159
customary authorities would have the ability to engage with human rights
norms and adapt their decisions to comply with constitutional violations.
The oversight of state courts adds some of the additional accountability to
the state missing from the negotiation, pragmatism, and participation
approaches.
This approach may work for customary law more broadly, but it can
become quite unwieldy for smaller land decisions. Assuming that the formal
court system is capable of handling the burden of hearing appeals of multiple
land claims,160 the formal courts still only intervene when a party takes the
step to appeal. This of course raises accessibility concerns. An enormous
benefit of the traditional, local-level dispute resolution bodies is that they are
easier to access and do not require as many resources from the aggrieved
parties. Appealing to a formal court may require travel, court fees,
bill in its various iterations has been sitting in Parliament for over forty years. The bill was
debated again in early 2013, was hotly contested by conservative members of Parliament, and
eventually was set aside. I Don’t: Uganda’s Controversial Marriage and Divorce Bill is Left
on the Shelf, THINK AFRICA PRESS (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://thinkAfricapress.com/
Uganda/i-don’t-controversial-marriage-and-divorce-bill-left-shelf.
156
Yngstrom, supra note 85, at 34.
157
Pimentel, supra note 137, at 23.
158
Id. at 25.
159
Id.
160
Disputes over land are very common, especially among family members and at the local
level. See, e.g., Polavarapu, supra note 90, at 133 (“Land disputes are the most common types
of disputes in Rwanda.”). Having these disputes heard twice, once at the local level and again
in a formal court, can become very burdensome on the court system.
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representation, and the freedom to take time away from home or work.
Thus, not all negative outcomes will make their way to court. Even when
they do, following up on court remands to ensure that subsequent customary
decisions are compliant with the constitution would require even more
resources. Non-governmental organizations and legal aid groups may be
well-positioned to support aggrieved parties throughout this process,
although the presence and funding required to impact communal groups
around the country would be quite high. Without highly accessible formal
court systems, this approach places a very high burden on those seeking to
exercise land rights, reducing the likelihood that many customary land rights
disputes will ever find their way to the formal courts.
E. Fundamentally Altering Gendered Customary Practices
The weaknesses of each approach described above illustrate the difficulty
in maintaining a separate and sovereign customary system that is also
accountable to equality and other human rights norms. Each carves out
methods for women to begin contesting and changing customary norms to
promote gender equality. However, each also suffers the risk that outcomes
will continue to be shaped by gendered power imbalances because of the
discretion available to customary institutions.
I suggest that an appropriate form of governance would draw from these
approaches, supporting local-level norm creation with greater involvement
from women, and would also incorporate greater state involvement at the
norm-creation level. To facilitate women’s negotiation for land rights, any
constitutional exemptions for customary law must be eliminated, and
statutory law must set foundational norms, including certain guaranteed
rights in marriage and succession, to which decisions regarding land
ownership and access must be bound. Such rights might include the right to
inherit, the right to own property, the right to receive maintenance upon
divorce, and recognized rights to marital property. These norms do not
dictate how decisions are to be made but only that certain principles must be
incorporated into the decision-making. Although such provisions would
certainly intrude upon arenas typically covered by customary law, without
them, women begin their negotiations from an inferior position. True
movement toward equality must begin with some evening of bargaining
power as between men and women.
Additionally, any power consolidated in single authority figures must be
dispersed among community members, men and women. As Bond has
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suggested, women can draw from their right to participate in customary
decisionmaking as provided for in the Maputo Protocol. Just as they do with
their parliamentary seats, states can, and should, go a step further and
mandate that any customary decision-making bodies be made up of a certain
percentage of women.161 Again, this is state intrusion and, to some, cooption of the sovereignty of customary institutions. However, if organically
created norms are to move towards protection and respect of women’s rights,
there must be assurances that women are able to participate in the norm
creation from a position of authority. In addition to having the opportunity
to contest norms, women must also have the power to shape outcomes.
However, increasing the number of women in decision-making roles and
improving statutory laws will be insufficient. Even as examples of
successful negotiation within customary structures note that women
sometimes relied on the principles of equality set out in the Constitution and
statutory law,162 these norms are just as easily rejected. Leaders in the
political center and customary leaders often portray gender normative
changes as going against tradition, culture, and custom. It is easy for them to
argue that such change is inconsistent with the will of the people and thus
illegitimate.
For any accountability to be felt by either customary or state actors,
customary institutions must consistently be held accountable to state
structures, and state structures must consistently be held responsible for the
decisions of customary institutions. Although the collateral review approach
nears this level of accountability, it requires women to take the extra step and
expend the resources to appeal to the formal court system.
A more systematic approach would require the involvement of a state
official in customary decision-making. For example, local-level officials,
such as land commissioners, members of land boards, or registrars, can serve
on customary decision-making bodies as part of their duties. In terms of
logistics, a certain day of the week could be a designated day for land claims,
on which day the state official would also sit on the decision-making body.
They would also be involved during consultations between indigenous
groups and outside actors to ensure that women’s voices are being heard and
their needs considered throughout the process. The involvement of state
officials would serve to heighten state accountability for land decisions that
161
Rwanda, for example, requires that 30% of the abunzi, a type of village-level mediation
council, be made up of women. Organic Law No. 31/2006 of 14/08/2006 on Organisation,
Jurisdiction, Competence and Functioning of the Mediation Committee, arts. 1–4 (Rwanda).
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are unconstitutional or that violate human rights norms to which the state is
bound.
Although typically unwritten, decisions should be recorded. To preserve
the flexible nature of customary law, these decisions would not be accorded
precedential value, but would be recorded and thus subject to review by other
government officials or independent women’s rights and human rights
groups. As with the collateral review approach, these state officials would
not have the right to tell the customary decision-making body how to rule or
what comprises the substance of customary law, but they would be
empowered to ensure that outcomes complied with normative floors set by
the constitution or by statute. An additional benefit of this approach is that it
promotes consistent engagement between state and customary legal systems
and encourages traditional leaders to grapple with human rights norms.
Of course, there is no guarantee that every state official will act in favor
of women’s rights. Indeed, one problem of the current plural system is that
state officials have supported patriarchal practices when they are considered
part of “custom.” Additionally, in terms of consultation, the government
sometimes facilitates land grabs or land deals with terms that are unfair to
indigenous groups. Insofar as a state official is deputized to consider
women’s rights, said official may also have a conflict of interest. These
drawbacks cannot be overlooked, but the important benefit of direct state
involvement is that the state will be unable to claim that it had no hand in
any rights violations occurring in the resolution of land claims or in the
process of consultation. Rights groups and the international community will
have the opportunity to hold states accountable.
The approach I outline above calls for much greater state intrusion into
the customary space than the negotiation, critical pragmatism, women’s
participation, or concurrent review approaches. It certainly does not allow
for the same amount of freedom to be afforded to customary institutions, and
it requires customary institutions to make some key fundamental changes in
the norm creation process by setting a normative floor, requiring women’s
participation as authority figures in norm creation, and requiring state
involvement. This admittedly disrupts the existing customary system. On
the other hand, it creates the most systematic accountability mechanism
while still allowing customary institutions to maintain a level of control over
the consideration of various social factors in its land tenure and dispute
resolution decisions. The dynamism and legitimacy of customary tenure
would be preserved, as rule-making would still belong to the people,
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although the rule-making power would be simultaneously more widelydispersed and bound by equality-promoting norms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, finding a way for customary and statutory law to
interact in a manner that protects both indigenous groups and women within
those groups is a herculean task. An arrangement that perfectly balances the
fine line between acknowledging the sovereignty of customary institutions
and keeping said institutions in line with equality norms that bind the state
may in fact be nothing more than a unicorn. However, the current hybrid
system of statutory/customary law interaction is not working, requiring a
rethinking of the model of legal pluralism.
Some suggest governments should protect customary tenure because it is
the system that reflects lived realities; however, lived realities do not always
reflect the will of each and every community member. Instead, the substance
of customary norms is the output of negotiations and power relations within
a community.163 “In legal disputes or political debates, stated cultural norms
are not neutral descriptions of a community’s way of life. Rather, such
articulations should be read as competing efforts to preserve certain social,
economic, and political arrangements.”164 This is the very heart of the failure
of the pro-culture argument. “Culture” is not singular, but is comprised of
subcultures. The culture that comes out as the “normal,” the monolith, is the
culture of those who control the narrative. As discussed in Part IV of this
Article, socio-economic pressures, such as increased competition for land
and unemployment, may cause increasingly exclusionary restatements of
these norms.
The law does not only serve to reflect the currently lived realities of
citizens; it embodies societal goals and influences behavior accordingly.
Hardly anyone would suggest that communities that have traditionally
engaged in bloody livestock raids should be permitted this activity simply
because it has been the lived reality. It is easy to categorize this as behavior
governments and society should not desire and thus to require its eradication.
Why not so for such severe discrimination against women?

163
Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 10, at 98 (noting, “[i]n the past, as today, norms were
not universally held, but contested, especially by those whose needs were not met and who
lacked voice in decision-making.”).
164
Nyamu, supra note 79, at 405.
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What the pro-customary argument always comes back to, however, is
legitimacy. If statutory laws are too heavy-handed, they will be ignored.
Both women and men in customary groups must be able to negotiate within
structures they deem legitimate. But even where the customary system must
exist in some form, the customary norm structure must be fundamentally
altered to comply with equality norms. The notion that groups will
wholeheartedly embrace such change when the time comes is true only in
part. Global history has demonstrated that such times arrive only after
consistent and concerted multi-prong efforts to change power structures.
This requires advocacy from within, advocacy from without, and legal
remedies.
Contemporary African governments have been willing to allow
customary law to occupy a space that was largely unaccountable to the
national government. Over the years, the constitutional exceptions for
customary law were removed, and judges have become increasingly willing
to overturn customary decisions but, for the most part, customary law
remains unaccountable. National governments should not be permitted to
abdicate responsibility for ensuring equality in this manner. If the state is the
main arbiter and provider of justice, then it must hold customary systems
accountable to its foundational norms, including the principle of equality.
This would not require that the state govern all aspects of customary tenure
but that it be willing to set a default floor for women’s participation and
substantive norms, and to serve as a backstop for women’s rights.
Governance systems seeking to engage with customary law, while
providing avenues to repair systematic inequalities—with respect to both
women and non-elites—must be prepared to fundamentally alter some of the
prevailing norms underlying customary systems of tenure.
The
customary/statutory hybrid that has existed to this point has not been
successful and has perhaps done more harm than good for both women and
indigenous groups. Certainly new systems of governance that are externally
imposed or otherwise illegitimate to the governed will not “take.” A more
palatable alternative, which would preserve the skeleton of customary land
tenure while altering key aspects of its substance and process, can address
some women’s rights concerns. Of course, there would likely be resistance,
especially from traditional authorities who have grown accustomed to being
the source of customary norms. There is also no guarantee that norms would
evolve quickly or in the most equitable manner. However, without both
improving women’s access to the customary political system and creating a
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substantive floor to guide norm creation, women’s rights under customary
tenure remain insubstantial.
If, in the past, each statement of a customary norm was a situs of debate,
customary law in the present has come to be defined by a single or few
leaders. Subjecting norms to increased negotiation, by both men and
women, with a chance to revisit each of the norms, would be more in line
with the oft-described original driving force of customary law: to reflect the
needs of the community. Increasing the number of women within decisionmaking bodies is more likely to ensure that the results of any consultations
are more reflective of women’s needs. Setting foundational norms will
encourage male and female decision-makers to make fairer decisions and
allow some measure of oversight. Additionally, a firm system of
accountability is necessary to prevent customary institutions from operating
outside constitutional and international rights requirements. Without such
fundamental changes, women will be unable to achieve substantive equality
under the customary system.

